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THE DISREGARD OF THE DOCTRINE OF
REASONABLE DOUBT
"The poor man under indictment is permitted to go through the forms and

appearances of a trial; but such a trial is only a mockery. He dares not assert
his innocence for fear of a double sentence at the end of a trial-a trial which
he knows he will be a travesty."--[Excerpt from foreword by Supreme Court
Justice W. 0. Howard in The Public Defender, by Mayer C. Goldman.]
THE DOCTRINE OF REASONABLE DOUBT.

N THE past many attorneys have learned, much to their

disappointment, that in practice the well-sounding doctrine of reasonable doubt is often not strictly adhered to,
and at times totally disregarded. But in fact there are many
other equally well-sounding theories that share the same
fate.
Since doubt is a state of the mind, it is therefore a
most difficult task to ascertain whether or not a given state
of facts would create a reasonable doubt in the mind of the
trier of the facts. In our effort to set up a criterion by
which we could determine whether or not a reasonable doubt
exists in a given case, we have created a mythical "prudent
man." However, the opinion of the "prudent man" is merely
the expression of the opinion of the average person hearing the facts.
Under certain circumstances we find that we ourselves
entertain a reasonable doubt, whereas the trier of the facts
does not. In seeking the reason for this difference of opinion, we resort to various sources which tend to throw some
light on this subject. It is in this manner that the writer
has attempted to make out a case against the prevailing
notion among members of the bar, that in all criminal cases
the defendant is given the benefit of a reasonable doubt.
In criminal cases it has been the rule to require a
greater quantity, weight or certainty of evidence than in
civil cases. 1 The reason for this rule is an historical one.
It dates back to a time when the Penal Code of England
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was a "fearfully bloody" one,2 and when the judges "would
warp the law in order to prevent convictions where they
were not in sympathy with over-severe laws or extreme penalties." 3 In hearing the evidence, the judges would seek out
a reason to doubt the defendant's guilt and acquit him if
such doubt was reasonable.
Today the doctrine of reasonable doubt has its definite
field of application. Specifically, it provides that in a criminal case, the defendant is to be given the benefit of a reasonable doubt, that is, if such a doubt exists. Under this
doctrine, if in the opinion of the trier of the facts, the proof
offered as to the guilt of the defendant is also susceptible of
a finding of innocence, then a reasonable doubt exists, and
the defendant must be acquitted.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt has been defined to be
that which amounts to a moral certainty as distinguished
from an absolute certainty. 4 In the case of People v. Barker,r, the New York Court of Appeals placed its stamp of
approval on a definition of reasonable doubt which was contained in a charge to a jury, and trial courts have ever since
used the identical words in instructing juries in criminal
cases.
It will be the writer's endeavor, in the pages that follow, to point out the various considerations which enter into
the trial of a criminal case, which operate to nullify and
render ineffectual this well-considered doctrine of our criminal law.
'Ibid. "When these rules began to take form and consistency, the penal
code of England was a fearfully bloody code. Death, without benefit of clergy,
was denounced against a multitude of misdoings which would now be considered, if offenses at all, offenses of a comparatively trivial character. The consequences of conviction to the unfortunate prisoner were not only fearful, but
they were irremediable. No human judge could help commiserating the situation of the all but foredoomed prisoner. * * * 'The maxim of the law is that it
is better that ninety-nine offenders shall escape than that one innocent man be
condemned.'"
'POUND,
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'People v. Bennet, 49 N. Y. 137 (1872) ; People v. Fitzgerald, 156 N. Y.
253, 50 N. E. 846 (1898); People v. Bonifacio, 190 N. Y. 150, 82 N. E. 1098
(1907).
People v. Barker, 153 N. Y. 111, 115, 47 N. E. 31, 32 (1897): "A reasonable doubt, gentlemen, is not a mere whim, guess or surmise; nor is it a mere
subterfuge to which resort may be had in order to avoid doing a disagreeable
thing; but is such a doubt as reasonable men may entertain after a careful and
honest review and consideration of the evidence in this case."
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THE DISREGARD OF THE REASONABLE DOUBT DOCTRINE.

*There are two major safeguards thrown around a person who is on trial charged with the commission of a crime.
The first is that the defendant is presumed to be innocent,
while the other is that this presumption continues until the
defendant has been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
In practice, however, these two safeguards are said to exist
only in theory. 6 In fact, it has been charged that both the
presumption of innocence and the doctrine of reasonable
7
doubt are mere fictions of the law.

One author, a man of considerable reputation and experience in the trial of criminal cases, having himself been
an Assistant District Attorney, has pointed out the absurdity
of the presumption of innocence theory in one of his books.8
He states that there are two factors which render this
theory a dead letter. One factor is that of experience while
the other is a psychological one. If A accuses B of a crime,
we know from experience that the chances are largely in
favor of A's accusation being well founded. People, as a
rule, do not go rushing around charging each other with
being thieves unless they have some reason for it. The psychological factor may be found in the uncharitable readiness with which we believe evil of our fellows. This willingness to believe the worst of others is a matter of common
knowledge.
Thus it is safe to assume that a defendant in a criminal
case is at a distinct disadvantage at the very outset of his
trial. There still remains the other major safeguard-the
doctrine of reasonable doubt-to which the defendant may
look. But here, too, he is doomed to disappointment, for the
truth of the matter is that the defendant rarely, if ever, receives the benefit of a reasonable doubt.
Of course we cannot find any decision or statement by
a court to the effect that the doctrine of reasonable doubt
6R. H. SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 110; M. C. GOLDMAN, THE PUBLIC
At page 36 of his book, Mr. Goldman calls the doctrine of reasonable doubt a "theoretical safeguard."
TRAIN, COURTS AND CRIMINALS 24.
8
1bid. at 15, 16.
DEFENDER.
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has been abrogated to some extent. We must also consider
the fact that a reasonable doubt is an intangible thing which
can exist only in the mind of the trier of the facts. However, since we can determine to a reasonable degree of certainty the intent with which an act was committed, so, too,
by considering the records, decisions and opinions of cases
tried over a period of time, together with the facts and circumstances under which they arose and were disposed of,
we can determine with a reasonable degree of certainty, the
operation of the mind of the great majority of the judges
sitting in our criminal courts.
Every now and then we have brought to our attention
the facts relating to some miscarriage of justice in a criminal case. More recently, the press throughout the nation informed the public of the wholesale miscarriages of justice
in cases tried in the "Women's Court" of the Borough of
Manhattan, City of New York. The disclosures concerning
the cases tried in that court speak eloquently for themselves
in the matter of proving the denial to defendants of that
which is theirs by right, namely, the benefit of a reasonable
doubt.
There are a number of factors which seem to have a
telling effect upon the decisions of judges sitting in the trial
of criminal cases. One of the chief factors lies in the fact
that very few cases are appealed. Of all the appeals heard
by the New York Court of Appeals, only eight 9 or ten pei
cent of the number are cases involving convictions in the
criminal courts. Of these criminal appeals, the majority
are from convictions by juries. Of the latter, a large number are from convictions of murder in the first degree, because appeals are mandatory in those cases. Therefore it
is quite evident that cases which are tried before Magistrates
very rarely reach the Court of Appeals. The great majority
of cases are not appealed and, therefore, the decisions of the
courts in deciding the questions of fact against the defendants stand regardless of the merits of these convictions.
Thus, injustices remain permanent in innumerable cases.
As a result, abuses of a glaring nature crept in and flourished
9

CARDOZo, LAW AND LITRATURE AND OTER ESSAYS 78.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

unchecked and unabated, as in the case of the so-called
"Women's Court" where the Magistrates went about their
work of deciding cases in a perfunctory manner which led
to the denial to defendants the benefit of a reasonable doubt.
The outstanding cause of this evil lies in a policy
adopted by the courts and the legislature of this state in the
matter of the trial and disposition of criminal cases. An
article appearing in recent issues of the New York Law
Journal clearly and definitely impresses one with an important policy in vogue in our criminal courts. 10 The author
of the article attempts to state a proposition of law, but
in so doing, he incidentally outlines what seems to be the
crystalized policy of our criminal courts. This policy seems
to be, that in the trial of cases, speed and economy are desirable, if not paramount, considerations.
At this point it should be noted that speed and economy
are the present-day by-words of industry, where efficiency
experts are employed for that very purpose. These experts
break up the various operations on a product into a number
of simple and distinct movements and then perfect a machine
for each motion. Thereafter, a separate worker is trained to
work an individual machine. This process develops experts
or specialists for each motion or process. In the course of
time these specialists learn to utilize the materials they
work on with a minimum of waste. In this way more products are produced at a lower operating cost. So deeply
rooted has this process become in recent years that its existence has given rise to a new school of economic thought
known as Technocracy.
The same tendency is present in our criminal court system. Especially is this true in the case of the Magistrates'
Courts of the city of New York where we have "Specialization
Courts" such as the "Women's Court," where vagrancy
(prostitution) cases and wayward minor cases are dealt
with; the "Traffic Court"; the "Family Court"; the "Homicide Court"; the "Commercial Frauds Court"; the "Municipal Term" where violations of certain city ordinances are
'"Transfer

of charges from Special Sessions to General Sessions," Part

I, at p. 738 of the New York Law Journal of August 30, 1932, and Part II, at
p. 752 of the New York Law Journal of August 31, 1932.
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tried; and the newly organized "Juveniles or Adolescents'
Court." Certain Magistrates are regularly assigned to preside in these "Specialization Courts." After they try the
same type of case over a period of time, they become specialists and apply a certain measure or yardstick by which they
determine the guilt or innocence of defendants. They become like the expert craftsman who throws aside very little
waste in shaping the materials to fit a particular design.
The judge in this position selects from the testimony only
those elements that he feels make up the crime or offense
charged, and if they are present, the defendant is invariably
found guilty. 11
The testimony for the prosecution in these cases is practically stereotyped.'
The complaining witnesses are asked
only those questions which elicit answers proving the elements of the crime or offense charged. Little or no time is
lost or wasted with cross examination. Trials move swiftly.
The by-word is speed. Thus, trials involving the liberty and
reputations of human beings are conducted along the same
principles on which the production manager operates the
factory. Time is saved and a greater number of cases disposed of. However, because of certain factors which affect
the decisions of these judges, the quest for efficiency leads
to a disregard of the doctrine of reasonable doubt. It would
seem that the courts are turned into factories where justice
is meted out in terms of efficiency.
One author, heretofore referred to, describes how the
policy of speed works out in the trial of cases in the Court
of Special Sessions.' 3 In relating the facts of a case which
]asted only three minutes, he shows how the People's case
'In the case of People v. Rose Davis, 9th District Magistrates' Court of
the Borough of Manhattan, in the City of New York (defendant was tried on
August 6, 1924, and sentenced on August 8, 1924), the court stated at p. 32 of
the stenographic record: "It may not be amiss for me at the present time to
state that the defendant's guilt has been proven to my satisfaction beyond a
reasonable doubt; * * *. All essential ingredientsand circumstances to warrant
arrestare present in this case."
The conviction in this case was reversed on the ground that the People had
failed to make out a mere prima facie case. (N. Y. L. J., Nov. 11, 1924, decision of the Appellate Part of the Court of Special Sessions, First Judicial
Department)
' See post the Probative Value of Police Testimony.
"TRAIN, T E PRISONER AT THE BAR 86-89.
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is made out by the Assistant District Attorney who asks
the complaining witnesses two or three pointed questions.
No time is lost in cross examining witnesses. The defendant takes the stand, and after denying his guilt, he is not
cross examined. The decision of the judges is immediately
announced from the bench.
This tendency towards specialization in our criminal
courts causes a question to arise. The question is, "What
special training, if any, is necessary in order to make one
an efficient trial judge in criminal cases?"
Before attempting to answer this question it becomes
necessary to state that there are apparently two diametrically opposed theories. One holds 14 that
"of the judge, like the engineer, expert training or
trained experience are required for the framing of
legal precepts and for applying them."
The other theory '15 is that
"the amount of training requisite to preside with efficiency at an ordinary trial is comparatively small,
and provided the judge be honest, impartial, possessed
of common sense, and what is known as 'backbone,'
neither the prosecutor nor defendant's counsel need,
as a rule, complain."
It would seem that the second theory is the more reasonable one. In fact, the trier of the facts in criminal cases
does not need any special training. The objections raised
at a criminal trial are always practically the same. The
charge to the jury in a criminal case, with the exception of
the statement regarding the law applicable to the case, is
always the same. In fact, if there were any need for training judges to frame legal precepts and in applying them
when objections are raised, what justification, if any, is there
for training a judge in the trial of a particular type of criminal case in which he is to be the sole trier of the facts?
"POUND, op. cit. supra note 3, at 43.
'5 Supra note 13, at 230.
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The most that can be said for the first theory, when
taken in connection with the trial of criminal cases in which
the judge is the trier of the facts, is that it is in line with
the present-day theory of speed and economy. Regardless
of the merits of either theory, the fact remains that the tendency is towards specialization. The idea of specialization
is firmly entrenched in our present criminal court system
and it is safe to say that it will remain with us for some
time to come.
Opinions by both trial and appellate courts seem to
point with approval to the fact that 1
"the Justices of the Court of Special Sessions are
experienced and fair-minded men who have heard
many similar cases,"
and also to the fact that 17
"the defendant was found guilty by a unanimous decision of three Justices of the Court of Special Sessions, each experienced in the trial of 'shoplifting'
cases."
The judges writing these opinions lose sight of the fact that
the honesty of these judges of the lower court is not questioned, but that defendants object to being tried by judges
whose decisions are affected by certain factors which deprive
them (the defendants) of the benefit of a reasonable doubt.
Specialization is a fine thing, and is to be desired where
commodities are concerned. But in the trial of criminal
cases, courts should not be concerned with the output of
cases in the same manner in which production managers
are concerned with the output of their products. They
should bear in mind that they are dealing with the lives and
fortunes of human beings and give them the benefit of a
reasonable doubt in cases where such a doubt exists. It is
here proposed to show where this system of specialization is
leading us.
"0People v. Marcus, 236 App. Div. 93, 98, 258 N. Y. Supp. 196, 201 (1st
Dept.1T 1932).
Ibid.
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IMPLIcIT FAITH IN TESTIMONY.

In the case of People v. Wade,"" the Court states:
"It is a matter of common knowledge that in the
great majority of cases removed from the Court of
Special Sessions the object is not to obtain a speedy
trial, but to get away from one."
In the writer's opinion, this statement is far from the truth.
In that case the Court had before it statistics dealing with
the large number of cases removed from the Court of Special Sessions to the Court of General Sessions under an old
statute by which a defendant was entitled to a removal of
his case as a matter of right. The Court in that case was
considering the time and expense involved in the presentation of such cases to grand juries and trial by petit juries.
The Court did not consider the fact that innumerable defendants desired removals because they preferred a jury
trial to one before judges who had a subconscious prejudice
against defendants. A large number of defendants seeking
removal of their cases do so because of the fact that they
feel that the Justices of the Court of Special Sessions have
an implicit faith in the testimony of municipal and private
police officers and detectives appearing in that court.
In becoming prejudiced against defendants in the manner stated above, the judges of that court have in effect prejudged the cases of defendants who thereafter appear in
their court. In the case of People v. Helen Gold, the defendant, in her affidavit which was submitted on a motion for
the removal of her case, complains of the implicit faith
which judges give to the testimony of certain witnesses, and
also explains a situation under which a defendant cannot expect to receive the benefit of a reasonable doubt. 19
People v. Wade, 26 Misc. 585, 588, 57 N. Y. Supp. 645, 647 (1899).
The following is an excerpt from an affidavit by the defendant in the
case of People v. Helen Gold, who was charged with petty larceny in an
information which was filed against her in the Court of Special Sessions of the
County of New York on April 13, 1928:
"Deponent is informed and believes that day after day in the Court
of Special Sessions the store detectives of the complaining store are
's
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Section 974 of the New York Penal Law makes it a
misdemeanor to possess policy slips. It is customary for
two or more police officers to participate in the raids in
which an arrest is made for violation of this section. The
defendant in such a case is arraigned upon the complaint of
one of the police officers who caused his arrest. When the
case is finally tried in the Court of Special Sessions, only
one police officer, that is, the one who swore to the complaint, is called to testify against the defendant. The other
officers who assisted in the arrest do not even appear in
court. The same is also true of cases tried in the "Women's
Court."120 The reason for this practice is obvious-the police-

men know that the courts have implicit faith in their testifor more than one
mony and think that it is unnecessary
21
officer to testify in a given case.
testifying as witnesses before the same judges of that Court in Petty
Larceny cases. Deponent is informed and believes that in all such cases
the word of the store detectives against the defendant is so implicitly
believed that an acquittal in thousands of such cases each year is e-'raordinarily rare. Deponent respectfully submits that the frequent appearances of such store detectives as witnesses and the convictions consequent
on their testimony has perhaps unconsciously in the minds of the judges
of that Court created an atmosphere of credibility towards the detectives'
testimony. Deponent feels that the result of this situation in such a case
is that the defendant, contrary to the first principle of Criminal Procedure, starts with a presumption of guilt against her instead of a presumption of innocence in her favor. Deponent respectfully urges on this
Court that she should be granted a trial before a jury of her peers which
has not seen and knows neither her accusers nor herself."
' Since the investigation into the Magistrates' Courts of the First Judicial
Department of the State of New York, the Magistrates sitting in the "Women's
Court" are more exacting in the matter of the amount of proof necessary in
order to convict a defendant charged with vagrancy (prostitution). They now
require the testimony of all available witnesses. They also require the production in court of the alleged "unknown man" in order that he may be identified
and his testimony taken.
' In the case of People v. Drake (2d District Magistrates' Court in the
Borough of Manhattan, City of New York, stenographic record dated Oct. 9,
1929), five police officers had participated in the raid in which the defendant was
arrested and charged with knowingly permitting a room to be used for purposes
of prostitution. At the trial, but one police officer appeared and testified
against the defendant. He was the police officer who had sworn to the complaint in the case. The defendant's counsel, on cross-examining the police
officer, asked him whether the other officers who had assisted in the arrest of
the defendant were in court. The police officer replied that they were not.
When he was further pressed on this matter, he stated that he did not believe
that it was necessary for them to be present in court. The police officer stated
that he felt that his testimony was sufficient and was all that was necessary.
When the defendant's attorney asked the police officer whether he expected the
Court to believe his uncorroborated testimony, the Court demanded an apology
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This practice on the part of the prosecution in which
it did not call available witnesses was condemned in the
cases of People v. Waehtel2

2

and People v. Martin,23 which

were originally tried in the "Women's Court."
In the Wachtel case, the People's case rested on an alleged admission by the defendant. This admission was denied by the defendant under oath and by another witness
who was present at the time of the arrest. Nevertheless the
defendant was convicted. An appeal was taken by the defendant. In its opinion the appellate court voiced its disapproval of the practice of only calling one police officer to
testify in cases where there are other witnesses who are
available to the prosecution. The appellate court ordered
the judgment of conviction revesed on the facts, dismissed
the complaint and discharged the defendant.
In the Martincase 2 4 the defendant was arrested in a hotel.
The complaining officer testified that his brother officer was
with him when the arrest was made, as was the hotel manager. On cross examination, in response to a question which
asked for the reason for the non-appearance of his brother
officer who was not present in court, the complaining officer
stated that he "didn't feel it was necessary to get him." The
defendant took the stand, and her story of the arrest completely contradicted that of the officer. She denied that she
from the lawyer who, in turn, insisted that he had not said anything of an
offending nature. The Court thereupon declared a mistrial and set the case
down for trial de novo before another judge. The defendant's attorney objected
to the mistrial, and later sued out a writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court.
The latter court discharged the defendant on the hearing of the writ, on the
ground that a new trial would constitute double jeopardy.
People v. Wachtel, 137 Misc. 205, 206, 244 N. Y. Supp. 462, 463 (1930).
People v. Martin, 9th District Magistrates' Court of the Borough of
Manhattan, City of New York, stenographic record dated Oct. 20, 1930.
2 Ibid. the Court stated:
"It is significant to note that not until the cross-examination of
Officer Brady was there any intimation that any other officer was concerned in the arrest.
"On cross-examination it developed that another officer, Morris,
entered the apartment with Brady and was present and saw practically
everything that transpired. It was later developed by the defense that
Officer Morris entered the apartment by an appreciable length of time
before Officer Brady. The District Attorney at no time called Officer
Morris to testify.
"The District Attorney did not see fit to call Officer Morris in
rebuttal."
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had misconducted herself. The defendant's attorney argued
for an acquittal on the ground that the officer's testimony
was uncorroborated. The Court found the defendant guilty.
The conviction was appealed to the appellate part of the
Court of Special Sessions. In reversing the conviction and
ordering a new trial, the appellate court again voiced its
disapproval of the practice of calling only one police officer
to testify in cases where there are other witnesses available
to the prosecution. 25
On the new trial the prosecution called the additional
witnesses and the defendant was acquitted. The subsequent
acquittal of the defendant Martin shows the danger of permitting the practice of calling only one officer to testify in
cases where two or more officers were witnesses to the facts.
It also shows the dangers arising out of the implicit faith
that judges have in police testimony.
Before leaving the subject of implicit faith, it is indeed
significant to note that the Court of Special Sessions, which
determines appeals from convictions before city Magistrates,
and which condemned the practice complained of above, permits the very same practice to continue in its own court
where misdemeanors are tried.
CONVICTION ON MERE ACCUSATION.

Some very interesting facts can be deduced from stenographic minutes of trials had before city Magistrates. The
results which follow are the fruits of a system which denies
to defendants the benefit of a reasonable doubt. These cases
show that Magistrates have a suspicion that all defendants
are guilty, and that they must prove themselves innocent.
Supra note 23, the Court stated:
"It appears on page 6 of the stenographic minutes that Officer
Browser testified that his partner Williamson and the hotel manager
were in the room at the time when he demanded and received from
defendant the return of the fifty dollars marked money which he alleges
he gave to the defendant. The prosecution did not call these witnesses.
"In a closely ontested case like this, we feel that their testimony
should have been introduced by the people." (See unreported opinion of
the Appellate Part of the Court of Special Sessions, dated Feb. 5, 1931.)
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In the cases of People v. Davis,2 6 People v. Harris and
Brown12 7 and People v. Miller, et al.,28 the police officer in
each case testified that he found an "unknown man" in the
defendant's apartment; that he (the "unknown man") stated
that he came there for a good time and had paid a sum of
money to the defendant for that purpose. The police officers further testified that the various defendants then and
there, and in the presence of the "unknown men," denied
the charge made by the latter, who were never produced in
court. The cases, as they stood before the Magistrates, were
merely the testimony by an officer of an alleged statement
by an "unknown man," and the denial of the charge by the
defendant. None of the acts charged in the alleged statement by the "unknown man" had occurred in the presence
of the officers. The testimony of the officers was mere hearsay, and when taken in connection with the denial of the
defendants, was worthless as proof. However, the Magistrates convicted all of these defendants. In each case an
appeal was taken and the conviction was reversed, complaint dismissed and the defendant discharged on the ground
that the People had failed to make out a prima facie case.
It would seem that the Magistrates felt that all that
was necessary in order to convict a defendant was to have
an accusation made against her under suspicious circumstances. It did not matter where, how and under what circumstances the accusation was made, and that none of the
alleged "unknown men" were ever produced in court. In
the last analysis, the proof of guilt in these cases was merely
the accusation made by an alleged "unknown man" who
was not produced in court and who was not under oath at
the time of making the charge. In basing convictions merely
on such testimony, the Magistrates were in effect putting
the defendants in a position whereby they had to prove
People v. Davis, 9th District Magistrates' Court of the Borough of
Manhattan, City of New York, stenographic record dated Aug. 6, 1924.
'People v. Harris and Brown, 9th District Magistrates' Court of the
Borough of Manhattan, City of New York, stenographic record dated Oct.

17, 1929.
' People v. Miller, et al., 9th District Magistrates' Court of the Borough
of Manhattan, City of New York, stenographic record dated May 15, 1930.
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themselves innocent beyond a reasonable doubt, thereby reversing the proper order of things.
In the case of People v. Brown,29 the defendant was
charged with offering to misconduct herself with an "unknown man" for the sum of $5.00 and that she exposed her
person for that purpose. The arresting police officer testified that the defendant Brown, at the time of her arrest,
was fully clothed and was seated in the living room of her
apartment in the company of several other women. He further testified that no money was passed between the alleged
"unknown man" and the defendant. Thus the proof offered
by the prosecution clearly established the innocence of the
defendant. The evidence also failed to prove the material
allegations of the complaint. The defendant rested on the
People's case, and moved to dismiss on the ground that the
People had failed to prove the material allegations set forth
in the complaint. The Magistrate denied this motion and
found the defendant guilty. The defendant appealed her
conviction. The appellate court reversed the conviction, dismissed the complaint and ordered the defendant discharged.
It is significant to note that before the defendant Brown
moved to dismiss the complaint, the Magistrate had indorsed
the following on the complaint against her: 30
"No competent legal proof of any demand or receipt
of any consideration by defendant. Dismissed. Dec.
19, 1929.
(Signed) 'Initials of Magistrate.'"
After the defendant had rested on the People's case, the
Magistrate put ink lines through the above words, and
found the defendant guilty. What caused the Magistrate
to do this? Were his suspicions aroused by the fact that
the defendant rested on the People's case? If they were,
he should have borne in mind that under our system of criminal justice, the defendant must be proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, and not convicted on mere suspicion. To
I' People v. Brown, 9th District Magistrates' Court of the Borough of
Manhattan, City of New York, stenographic record dated June 21, 1928.

' Notation endorsed on the complaint filed in the case cited supra note 29.
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require the defendant to offer a defense in this case is tantamount to requiring her to prove her innocence beyond any
shadow of suspicionA1
SOME FACTORS WHICH SEEM TO AFFECT THE DECISIONS
OF JUDGES.

Many Magistrates have convicted defendants for reasons which do not appear on the record. This must not be
taken to mean that the courts in those cases had acted dishonestly or corruptly. However, this does mean that certain factors which are not disclosed by the record had a
In the case of People v. Hecht, et al. (2d District Magistrates' Court of
the Borough of Manhattan, City of New York, stenographic record dated June
22, 1930), the arresting police officer charged the defendants with disorderly
conduct in that they used "threatening, abusive and insulting behavior, with
intent to provoke a breach of the peace, and whereby a breach of the peace
might be occasioned; that the said defendants at the hour of about 2:30 P. M.
did then and there obstruct the sidewalk while engaged in a game of dice for
money with a numbers of others."
At the trial, the police officer gave the following testimony:
"Q. Were these defendants right in the group? A. They were
nearby watching the game.
Q. Did you see the various defendants roll the dice? A. No, none
of these boys.
Q. Did you at any time see these defendants handle or engage in
the handling of any money? A. No, I did not."
The proof offered by the prosecution failed to prove any of the material
allegations in the complaint. Yet the Magistrate denied the defendants' motion
to dismiss at the end of the People's case. One of the defendants took the
witness stand and testified in his own behalf. He denied the allegations in the
complaint. On cross-examination he was asked merely four questions. When
the defendants' counsel called a second witness (one of the defendants) to the
stand, the following took place between the Court and the attorney:
"The Court: Do you want to swear each one of them?
Defense Counsel: Just as you say.
The Court: All right, we will continue this."
Each of the other defendants then took the stand and denied the allegations
in the complaint. No trouble was taken to cross-examine them. The failure
to cross-examine these defendants, when viewed in the light of the conversation
between the Court and the defendants' counsel, is indicative of the fact that the
Court had concluded that they were guilty. The Court did not take into consideration the fact that the officer had stated that the defendants did not participate in the game. Nevertheless, each of the defendants was found guilty.
In this case the proof offered by the prosecution not only failed to make
out a prima facie case, but also established the innocence of the defendants.
However, the Magistrate overcame the reasonable doubt doctrine and the
deficiency of proof by drawing inferences which the evidence did not legally
justify. The convictions were appealed, and the Appellate Part of the Court
of Special Sessions ruled: "Convictions reversed as against the weight of
evidence, defendants discharged, complaint dismissed and fines ordered returned."
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decisive effect upon the ultimate decision of the trier of the
facts.
Some judges have publicly acknowledged that they convicted a defendant because they did not believe that a police
officer would commit perjury. Even the Court of Appeals,
in affirming a conviction, stated that to believe the defendant's story was to conclude that all witnesses against him
had committed perjury.3 2 In dissenting from an opinion
reversing a conviction of a defendant in a vagrancy case, aJustice of the appellate part of the Court of Special Sessions said that he was unable to agree with the prevailing
opinion because, in so doing, he would in effect find that
perjury had been committed by four police officers who had
testified against the defendant at the trial in the "Women's
Court." 33 Thus; it would seem that a factor which is not
disclosed in the record is that judges hesitate to acquit a
defendant when, in so doing, an inference that the complaining witnesses had committed perjury might be suggested.
Another factor which is not disclosed by the records is
that suspicious attitude which courts seem to take towards
the testimony of the defendant and his witnesses. This is
due in part to the fact that the defendant has a personal interest in the outcome of the case. It is also due in part to
the inability of the defendant to prove a motive for a police
officer or other prosecution witnesses to give false testimony.
It is almost impossible to make a police officer admit things
which would tend to prove a motive on his part to testify
falsely. In affirming a conviction, an appellate court
stated: 84
"The oral evidence against them (the two defendants)
is furnished by two police officers, whose testimony is
easily preferred to the manifestly contrived stories of
the defendants."
'People v. Barker, 153 N. Y. 111, 114, 47 N. E. 31, 32 (1897).
'People v. Hammerstein. See dissenting opinion of unreported case on
appeal in which decision was rendered by the Appellate Part of the Court of
Special Sessions on Oct. 22, 1930.
3'People v. Solomon, et al., 174 App. Div. 144, 145, 160 N. Y. Supp. 942,
943 (2d Dept. 1916).
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Since the appellate court acts upon the record of the case
and is not personally acquainted with the facts, its statement can be ascribed only to the suspicious attitude judges
assume towards the defendants' stories.
There cannot be any doubt but that the activities of
certain so-called reform organizations, which have certain
courts under their vigilant eye, seriously interfere with a
true and just administration of justice in those courts.
These organizations, self-appointed reformers of mankind,
which gather funds from noble-minded persons, publish
periodic reports in which the work of the various judges and
other officials attached to the courts under review is discussed. These reports also list the number of cases tried,
and the number of acquittals or convictions had before each
judge. They seem to impress one with the idea that a large
number of convictions can be obtained if attention tantamount to pressure is directed towards the court. Judges,
in deciding cases, have the ever-present fear of criticism in
case their average of convictions falls below that of the other
members of their court. Thus, many defendants are deprived of the benefit of a reasonable doubt because of the activities of these organizations.
Every now and then the press or some other agency
arouses the public to a sort of consciousness of an existing
crime wave or to the recurrence of a particular type of
crime. On such occasions convictions are more frequent and
sentences are more severe than usual. These occasions are
known as periods of hysteria, during which judges seem to
refuse to assume the responsibility of discharging defendants in numerous instances where a reasonable doubt as
to the defendant's guilt clearly existed.
During the investigation of the Magistrates' Courts of
the First Judicial Department, the Tombs Prison of New
York County was overcrowded with prisoners. This condition resulted from a hysteria among the Magistrates because some of them had been called upon to account for their
official acts. The timid Magistrates were convicting defendants in more cases than usual, because complaints, which
ordinarily were dismissed, were entertained and convictions
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had. Thus, a hysteria in many instances deprived a defendant of the benefit of a reasonable doubt.
The fear that the decision of the court may be affected
by the hysteria of the age seems to have been a problem
from time immemorial. It would not be amiss to direct
the attention of our present-day jurists to the vigorous plea,
made by Socrates before the Greek senate, in which he
staked his life in order that justice, free from prejudice
and hysteria, might triumph.3 5 The action of Socrates is
cited as an illustrious model of judicial duty fearlessly performed.
THE

PROBATIVE VALUE OF POLICE TESTIMONY.

Careful examination discloses that the testimony of
police officers is to be closely scrutinized, because "
"The memoirs and reminiscences of experienced trial
lawyers contain abundant and uniform testimony to
the effect that the evidence of the police is apt to be
so colored and warped as to be the subject of grave
doubt."
In their zeal to convict a person whom they believe to be
guilty, they not only overlook that which would prove a
defendant's innocence, but they withhold such information
from the prosecutor, defense attorney, and the Court, and
believe themselves justified in doing so.
A review of numerous stenographic records of trials had
in the "Women's Court" reveals that the testimony of police
"What I am going to tell you may be a commonplace in the Courts of
Law; nevertheless it is true. * * * When you wished to try the generals, who
did not rescue their men after the battle of Arginusze, in a body, which was
illegal, as you all came to think afterwards, the tribe of Antiochis, to which I
belong, held the Presidency. On that occasion I alone of all the Presidents
opposed your illegal action, and gave my vote against you. The speakers were
ready to suspend me and arrest me; and you were clamoring against me, and
crying out to me to submit. But I thought that I ought to face the danger out
in the cause of Law and Justice, rather than join with you in your unjust
proposal, from fear of imprisonment or death." (Quoted at pp. 94 and 95 of
the brief submitted by the relator-respondent in the case of People, etc., ex rel.
George A. McManus v. The Warden of the City Prison, etc., 226 App. Div. 364,
235 N. Y. Supp. 112 [1st Dept. 1929].)
"POUND,
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officers is nearly the same in every case. In fact, in some
instances the testimony seems to be identical. The testimoney of the same officer in two or more cases is the same,
verbatim, the only differences being in the names and addresses. Testimony by a police officer, such as "I asked this
'unknown man' what he was doing there, and he said 'I came
here for a good time'; I then asked the defendant if this
was true, and she said 'Yes, give me another chance,' appears in record after record. To say that the identical
words were used in every case and that every defendant
admitted her guilt in the same fashion, is a fact that should
cause a Magistrate to become highly suspicious of those giving that testimony, and to cast grave doubt upon it. The
fact remains that the same judges heard the same police
officers telling them the same story time and again and believed them without hesitation. It seems incredible that
judges should prefer such testimony, which clearly appears
to be stereotyped, to the straightforward stories of defendants and their witnesses.
In reading the cases referred to above, one comes to the
conclusion that police officers are experienced witnesses who
know the elements of each crime and supply details whenever they are needed in order to make out a case. These
officers seize every opportunity to testify to some alleged admission that the defendant made. It is indeed dangerous
for a defense attorney to ask a police officer on cross examination, "What did the defendant say when you questioned
her?" Almost invariably, the reply will be "She said, 'Yes,
I did it, give me another chance.'" They seldom, if ever,
testify to a denial by a defendant.
It is significant to note that the New York City Police
Department issues certain rules and regulations which explain in detail the testimony required in various types of
cases. When testifying in court, police officers usually make
their testimony fulfill the requirements laid down in these
rules and regulations. Police officers receive instructions
in criminal law and in the testimony required in prosecutions for infractions of those laws. Gambling experts explain various games to them, and assistant district attorneys instruct them as to how testimony should be given in
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criminal cases and the proof necessary in order to obtain a
conviction. The following, taken from the stenographic record of a case, bears witness to the foregoing: 37
"By the Assistant District Attorney: Q. Have you
had instructions, school instruction, in the matter
of the playing of policy, policy playing?
"By the Police Officer: A. I have."
From the foregoing it is clear that caution should be
used when police testimony forms the main support of the
People's case. Especially should this be done in cases
where the defense produces witnesses to disprove the complaining police officer's story. However, courts insist on
giving greater credence to the testimony of police officers
than to the testimony of the defendant and his or her witnesses. It therefore becomes just a matter for the police
officer to make out a prima facie case in order that a conviction follow. Under such a state of affairs, a defendant
cannot receive the benefit of a reasonable doubt. Yet, that
is exactly the state of affairs that was shown to exist in
the "Women's Court."
PERJURY BY STATE'S WITNESSES.

The recent investigation of the Magistrates' Courts of
the First Judicial Department disclosed that state witnesses
had committed perjury in innumerable cases. Wholesale
"framing" of defendants was disclosed. The following cases
are examples wherein the testimony of the state witnesses
were open to grave doubt, but nevertheless, the defendants
were convicted. In some instances the stenographic minutes of the case or an opinion or a decision either openly
or impliedly suggests that the complaining witnesses had
committed perjury in order to obtain a conviction.
In the case of People v. Edwards,3 8 the defendant appealed
her conviction for vagrancy (prostitution) claiming thal
'

People v. Joseph Olivo, 9th District Magistrates' Court of the Borough

of Brooklyn, City of New York, stenographic record dated June 13, 1930, p. 4.
People v. Edwards, 180 N. Y. Supp. 631 (1920).
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she had been convicted on the perjured testimony of two
police officers. In that case the police officers testified that
one of the women in the apartment was disrobed. However,
on cross-examination it was developed that this woman was
fully clothed and wore an apron when she was brought to
the station house. The defense witnesses testified that they
were fully clothed and that the police officers, after entering the apartment through a ruse, took the women to the
station house in the same condition in which they were
found. They stated that the woman who was alleged to
have been disrobed and in the company of a man, was fully
clothed and wore an apron over her dress while ironing
clothes. Their testimony further showed that no other men
outside of the two police officers were in the apartment. The
Appellate Court, after analyzing the evidence, reversed the
conviction and dismissed the complaint, stating that the testimony of the police officers had all the earmarks of
fabrication.
Could it be said that the Magistrate, before whom the
Edwards case was tried, analyzed the officers' stories, or that
lie used caution in accepting their testimony? The attitude
assumed by some magistrates was that if the police officer
said so, then it was true. They could not lead themselves to
believe that police officers would commit perjury. A defendant cannot expect to be given the benefit of a reasonable
doubt under such conditions.
In the case of People v. Minnie Stein,39 the defendant
In the case of People v. Minnie Stein (9th District Magistrates' Court
of the Borough of Manhattan, City of New York, stenographic record of this
case in which the defendant was convicted on Sept. 21, 1925), the defendant
had been held up and robbed by one Horowitz. She appeared against the robber
in the Magistrates' Court and before the Grand Jury which indicted him for
robbery. Friends of the indicted man made several attempts at silencing Mrs.
Stein, but they were unsuccessful. He informed the police that her family and
herself had been threatened and that they were in danger of being bodily
harmed. The detective who had arrested Horowitz arranged for her to
telephone him for immediate aid whenever the occasion for such aid arose. On
several occasions, when she telephoned to the detective for assistance, he arrived
shortly after the intruders had disappeared. On one occasion, he caught a
police officer in civilian clothes attempting to break into Mrs. Stein's home in
order to work up a prostitution case against her. The detective reported this
incident to his captain.
Some time thereafter, Mrs. Stein heard someone trying to break the door
leading into her apartment. She climbed out of the window and went to the
street and then down to the corner drug store where she entered a telephone
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not only created a reasonable doubt as to her guilt, but she
apparently succeeded in proving that she was the victim of a
plot to "frame her" in order to save a robber against whom
booth and attempted to call the detective. While in the telephone booth, a man
entered the drug store and dragged her out of the booth. While taking her
back to her apartment, he slapped her and tore her house dress. In the apartment there was another man holding her boarder who had been asleep in his
room, the door of which had been bolted at the time when Mrs. Stein fled from
the apartment window. The two men, who later turned out to be police officers,
informed Mrs. Stein and her boarder that they were under arrest, but did not
mention the nature of the charge against them. The two prisoners were then
taken outside to an automobile in which the police officers took them to the
police station. Near the automobile stood a short dark man who had a short
conversation with the police officers. The police officers charged Mrs. Stein
with committing prostitution with an "unknown man" who later turned out to
be the short dark man who stood near the automobile. The boarder was
charged with maintaining a house for immoral purposes. The police officers
failed to appear for the trial of the border and the charge against him was
dismissed and he was discharged. However, they appeared in court in order
to testify against Mrs. Stein.
Pending the trial of Mrs. Stein, the alleged "unknown man" visited her
store and informed her that he felt sorry for her; that she was being "framed"
by the friends of Horowitz; that Horowitz's friends had paid the police officers
to frame her in order to discredit her; that he had influence in the "Women's
Court"; that he could obtain her acquittal if she paid him the sum of $250.00;
and that part of the $250.00 was to go to the police officers who had arrested
her. She told him to return another day and that she would then have the
money for him. When he did return, the detective in the Horowitz case stood
secreted behind a partition from where he could see the "unknown man" and
could hear him talk to Mrs. Stein. Upon the "unknown man's" assuring Mrs.
Stein that she would be discharged if she paid him the sum of $250.00, and
after repeating in sum and substance the story that he had told to her on the
previous occasion concerning the "framing" of her case, she paid him in
marked money which he placed in the leather band on the inside of his hat.
Thereupon, the detective seized him and, after recovering the money, arrested
him for extortion. After the boarder had testified at the first day of Mrs.
Stein's trial, he was severely beaten by thugs and removed to a hospital, where
he was found to be suffering from a fractured skull.
The defendant Stein produced, in her defense, numerous other witnesses
besides the detective above mentioned. She and her boarder denied that any
other men outside the police officers were in the apartment when they were
arrested. The case before the Court clearly proved that Mrs. Stein was being
"railroaded" in order to save the robber against whom she was to testify in the
County Court. Notwithstanding the fact that the Court had all this proof
before it, Mrs. Stein was convicted and sentenced to a term in jail.
The case was appealed to the Appellate Part of the Court of Special
Sessions and the defendant was released in bail pending the determination of
her appeal. The conviction was reversed and the case was sent back for a new
trial. In the meantime, the alleged "unknown man" was convicted of extorting
money from Mrs. Stein and received a jail sentence. Enraged at the failure
of the two police officers to save him from going to jail, the "unknown man"
confessed that the case against Mrs. Stein was "framed" and that he was
never in her apartment.
When the case was called for retrial, the Court dismissed the complaint on
motion of defense counsel (Jan 6, 1926). The District Attorney's office consented to the dismissal of the charge.
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she was to testify in the County Court. However, she was
convicted and sent to jail by the Magistrate who heard the
case. It was only through the timely action of an appellate
court that she was enabled to prove her innocence and send
the alleged "unknown man" to jail as an extortionist.
The Stein case clearly shows that it is almost impossible
for a defendant to receive the benefit of a reasonable doubt
when the acquittal of a defendant who claims that she was
"framed" might result in justice being dealt out to those who
had attempted to swear her liberty away.
Another case which emphasizes the point raised in the
preceding paragraph is that of People v. Hammerstein.4 0 In
that case, the widow of a theatrical magnate was arrested
and charged with cTagrancy (prostitution). At her trial, four
police officers testified against her. A number of witnesses appeared for the defendant. She was convicted, after a bitterly
contested trial. An appeal was taken and the conviction was
reversed, complaint dismissed and the defendant discharged.
However, one of the justices of the Appellate Court dissented
from the judgment of that court and wrote an opinion, in
which he stated that he was unable to vote for a reversal of
the conviction in the lower court because, in so doing, he
would in effect imply that the four complaining police officers had committed perjury at the trial. Such an attitude on
the part of a judge is extremely dangerous, because he is
assuming a position which is highly prejudicial to defendants
appearing before him. In effect, it causes him to deny to
them the benefit of a reasonable doubt because the police
officers later might be accused of perjury.
It is interesting to note what the future held in store for
the four police officers whom the dissenting justice refused to
believe would commit perjury. Three were indicted for perjury as the result of the disclosures in the Magistrates'
Courts' investigation and were suspended. Of these three, one
died while under suspension and indictment; a second was
tried and acquitted and restored to duty as a police officer;
the third was tried, convicted and sentenced to prison. The
' Supra note 33.
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conviction of this last police officer was affirmed by both the
Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals.
Would the dissenting Justice still consider the testimony of police officers unimpeachable under any and all circumstances after he learned of the fate of three of the men
whom he refused to believe would commit perjury? In finding that a reasonable doubt exists, the trier of the facts does
not necessarily have to conclude that the police officers had
committed perjury, but he finds that the evidence of guilt is
not inconsistent with innocence. The attitude of the dissenting Justice, as evidenced by his opinion, is therefore unjustifiable.

THE REASONABLE DOUBT DOCTRINE AND THE JURY.

Earlier in this article reference was made to the fact
that a large number of defendants prefer a trial by jury to
one before the Court of Special Sessions, where three judges
are the triers of the facts. This must not be taken to mean
that in obtaining a trial before a jury a defendant is assured
that he will be given the benefit of a reasonable doubt. The
truth of the matter seems to be that jurors do not apply the
doctrine of reasonable doubt very freely. However, because
of their lack of legal training, juries are more apt to acquit a
defendant in cases where sympathy, mercy or leniency is
desirable, than a judge who is schooled in legal precepts and
in their application to a given state of facts unaffected by
any outside considerations.
There seem to be four conditions under which juries are
unable properly to apply the doctrine of reasonable doubt.
These conditions are:
1. Where the jury is selected after the press or some
other agency has inflamed public opinion.
2. Where a threatening mob outside the courthouse
demands the conviction of the defendant.
3. Where the Judge or District Attorney has made an
inflammatory statement in the presence of the jury.
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4. Where the jury does not understand the doctrine of
reasonable doubt, even though the court has taken
great pains to explain it to them.
Experience has taught us that, under certain conditions,
human beings will abandon reason and will let their emotions control their actions. Such occasions arise where public opinion is aroused by the press or some other agency. 4
The result is "mob action." Persons affected in this manner
will not listen to reason. Unfortunately, this mob atmosphere
is very often carried into both the jury box and the jury
room.
Very few persons will seriously contend that a defendant who is on trial while the state militia has to guard the
courthouse from a hostile mob which is desirous of entering
the building and lynching him, will be given the benefit of a
reasonable doubt. Yet, such was the condition in the case of
Leo Frank in the state of Georgia and of the colored youths
in the more recent Scottsboro case. Could these defendants
expect to receive the benefit of a reasonable doubt from juries
selected from the very same neighborhood that the restless
mob outside the courthouse came from? Undoubtedly, the
verdicts of these juries expressed the sentiment of the people
in the neighborhood. The verdicts of these juries, in effect,
gave to the howling mobs that which they desired-blood.
In relating the story of the capture of the actual perpetrators of a bank robbery at Lamar, Colorado, in which several persons were slain, a newspaper reporter very vividly
portrays the atmosphere under which four innocent men had
been previously arrested for that crime and faced what may
be termed "judicial murder": 42
"The trial of the four suspects (the innocent men) in
Lamar approached, and public demand for retribution
was so great, a verdict of guilty seemed assured, although the prosecutor had not been able to break down
their alibis."
POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA

69, 70; People v. Tait, 234 App.

Div. 433, 443, 255 N. Y. Supp. 455, 465 (1st Dept. 1932).
," N. Y. World-Telegram of Feb. 4, 1933, at 13.
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The newspaper account very clearly shows the danger of
proceeding to trial under such conditions. The public is desirous of obtaining a conviction, and does not concern itself
with such matters as the protection of the rights and interests of accused persons. They come to court to convict the
defendant and not to give him the benefit of anything, not
even the benefit of a reasonable doubt. Under such conditions, "a verdict of guilty seemed assured."
In the city of New York, the press had aroused public
opinion to such a tense pitch, through statements concerning
members of the vice squad of the Police Department, that
certain members of this squad who were tried for perjury
while the Magistrates' Courts' investigation was in progress
were convicted, while others, who were more fortunate in
being tried after the clamor for their conviction had subsided,
were acquitted. A strange coincidence, which occurred as a
result of the above investigation, was the conviction of one
police officer named Tait and the ultimate reinstatement of
his brother officer. Both of these police officers had participated in the arrest of a colored woman whom they charged
with prostitution. Tait was tried while the investigation was
still in progress, while his brother officer was tried after the
investigation had closed and public opinion against them
had subsided.
During the investigation, women who had previously
been arrested and charged with prostitution were called as
witnesses and they charged that they had been "framed" by
police officers and sent to jail as the result of perjured testimony. The press of the nation, and more particularly of the
city of New York, broadcasted the stories and charges of
these women. Civic organizations took an active interest
against the police officers involved. Newspapers carried
lengthy editorials denouncing the vice squad. They were also
denounced from the pulpits of many churches. Public sentiment ran high against the accused men.
While the press was still carrying the stories of the
"framing" of women, a number of police officers were indicted
by the Grand Jury, which charged that the police officers had
committed perjury in the cases of these women. One of these
police officers was one Sidney D. Tait. He was immediately
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placed on trial. The witnesses against him were a prostitute,
an inmate of her establishment, and one Chile Acuna, a confessed "stool pigeon," who claimed to have helped Tait
"frame" the woman. Tait was convicted.
The conviction of Tait was appealed, but the Appellate
Division, by a vote of three to two, affirmed the conviction.
The Court of Appeals, by a divided court, affirmed the deci"sion of the Appellate Division. However, the significant fact
about this case is the dissenting opinion of one of the justices
of the Appellate Division. This opinion clearly demonstrates
the danger of placing a defendant on trial while public opinion is strongly against him. The opinion states that a defendant in such position is not given the benefit of the safeguards provided by law, and also states that such person
does not receive a fair trial. 43 With the facts as they are
disclosed in the dissenting opinion of the Tait case in mind,
could serious contention be made that he might expect a jury
to give him the benefit of a reasonable doubt?
In cases where the issues are close, and the jury may as a
matter of fact find that there exists a reasonable doubt as to
the defendants' guilt, defendants are frequently deprived of
the possibility of an acquittal when the judge, in charging
the jury, makes an inflammatory statement which might
readily cause a jury to become emotional, abandon reason
and resort to the "mob spirit." However, such statements are
sometimes made by judges who are honest, but who would
not like to see the acquittal of a defendant whom they believe
" In the case of People v. Tait, supra note 41, at 443, 255 N. Y. Supp. at
465, one of the dissenting justices states:
"The defendant entered upon the trial under a presumption of innocence. It must be borne in mind that the trial of the defendant in the
Court of General Sessions was held soon after the revelations as to the
alleged 'framing' of dissolute women by members of the Vice Squad of
the New York Police Department, and at a time when public feeling ran
high and prejudice had been aroused against members of the Vice Squad
for such claimed dishonest practices. A sensational public press, ever
ready to seize upon the spectacular, did much to influence the public
mind against honest police officers as a whole for wrongful acts committed by a comparatively few. It was at such a time and under such
unfavorable circumstances that the defendant was indicted and tried.
There was not a scintilla of evidence, nor was there any claim, that the
defendant had received anything as a consideration for the alleged false
testimony which he was charged with having given in Magistrates'
Court."
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is guilty. Such attitude
on the part of trial judges should be
44
discouraged because
"Nothing strikes so sharply at our conception of liberty as the failure of criminal justice, and the conviction of a defendant not legally proven guilty. * * *
The partisan judge, who makes up his mind to convict
or acquit if he can, may be right nine times out of ten,
but the other time he commits an outrage."
In the two cases, summaries of which follow, the trial
Court made a statement to the jury which the attorneys for
each of the defendants involved took exception to. In each
case an appeal was taken, but the conviction was affirmed.
However, careful consideration of each statement leads one
to the irresistible conclusion that they are extremely dangerous and must have a telling effect upon a jury which is
always on the alert to take its cue from the court as to the
latter's opinion of the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
In the case of one Stein, the defendant was arrested and
charged with the crime of murder in the then famous "Vivian
Gordon case." Shortly after the arraignment of Stein on the
murder charge, a woman identified him as the man who had
robbed her about a year prior thereto. After his acquittal on
the murder charge, Stein was brought to trial on the robbery
charge. The latter trial was bitterly contested, the issues
were close, and the defendant produced witnesses who proved
a reasonable alibi in his behalf. But the court, in charging
the jury, made the following remark: 45
"There is a constant warfare between the criminal
and society, and jurors and judges are the last line of
defense in that warfare."
Surely, the jury could not have otherwise supposed but
that, as "the last line of defense in that warfare," a verdict
of guilty was expected of them. What did a so-called "warfare between the criminal and society" have to do with guilt
"TRAIN,
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' 5 People v. Harry Stein, 255 N. Y. Supp. 967 (1932).
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or innocence of Stein. The question for the jury to decide
was whether Stein had been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the robbery charged against him. Stein was
convicted and he appealed, claiming that the remark deprived
him of the benefit of a reasonable doubt because it tended to
arouse the passions of the jury against him. However, the
conviction was affirmed without opinion. It is to be regretted
that the Appellate Court did not see fit to write an opinion on
such an important matter as the propriety of the remark and
the effect it must have had.
The same trial Judge presided in the case of People v.
Salmore, and another, in which, at the close of the charge, he
instructed the jury that: 46
"If juries will not bring in honest and proper verdicts,
we might as well close up the courts and turn the city
over to the racketeers."
In the Salmore case, the defendants were charged with
criminally receiving stolen property. What did the question
of "closing up the courts and turning the city over to the
racketeers" have to do with the guilt or innocence of the
defendants? The question for the jury to decide was whether
the defendants had been proven guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, and not how they felt about racketeers. The defendants were convicted. On appeal, their convictions were
affirmed despite the prejudicial remark referred to above.
The statements by the court to the jury in both the Stein
and the Satmore cases may have indicated very plainly its
own belief in the defendant's guilt, and unmistakably conveyed that impression to the jury. An attempt by the presiding judge to influence the verdict of a jury does not coincide
with the declared function of a judge presiding in a jury
trial.47 The ultimate effect of permitting the remarks com"People v. Salmore, 233 App. Div. 522, 253 N. Y. Supp. 589 (1st Dept.
1931).
7In the case of People v. Wansker, 108 Misc. 84, 88, 177 N. Y. Supp. 295,
297 (1919) the Court stated:
"Under our system of trial by jury in criminal cases, the presiding
judge has one great duty to perform. He does not sit to prosecute the
accused; he is not there to aid the attorney for the people to secure a
conviction; he is not there to control the ultimate action of the jury in
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plained of in the above cases will be, if unchecked, to reduce
the jury system to a barren formality, an empty form with
only a curious historical meaning. Certainly the conception
of trial by jury entertained by the framers of the Constitution was something more than a body of men designed to
record perfunctorily the decisions and impressions of the
48
trial judge.
Can it therefore be said that, after it has heard a judge
make an inflammatory statement which might be taken as an
indication of his belief that the defendant is guilty, a jury
will retire and give the defendant the benefit of a reasonable
doubt? Clearly, the effect of such a remark is to prejudice
the jury against the defendant in such a manner that they
are unable to give him the benefit of a reasonable doubt.
Lastly, it has been charged by various authorities that
juries do not intelligently understand the court's explanation of the doctrine of reasonable doubt,49 nor that they are
competent enough to apply it. Regardless of what the cause
or causes may be, the ultimate result is always the same-the
defendant fails to receive the benefit of a reasonable doubt.
the discharge of its function of passing upon the guilt or innocence of
the defendant. But he is there to see that justice is administered
impartially, not according to his own views as to the guilt or innocence
of the accused, but according to established rules of legal procedure."
"In the case of People v. De Martine, 205 App. Div. 80, 88, 199 N. Y.
Supp. 426, 432, 433 (2d Dept. 1923), citing People v. Becker, 210 N. Y. 274,
104 N. E. 396 (1914), the Court stated:
"Jurors are always alert to discover the impressions made upon the
more experienced mind of the trial judge, and the influence exerted by a
forceful judge is very potent, and when, although unintentionally, his
attitude portrays emphatic approval of one side and all connected therewith, there must necessarily result an impairment of that free and
unbiased verdict which under our system of jurisprudence is regarded as
essential to the administration of justice."
FLOYD HENRY ALLPORT, in his book, SOCIAL PSYcHOLOGY, at 426, states:
"We have long standing attitudes of respect and obedience to age,
prestige, and expert opinion. Hence, any language suggestion from
sources of this character liberates the response suggested."
ROBERT S. WOODWORTH, in his book, PSYCHOLOGY-A STUDY OF MENTAL
LIFE, 549, states:
"Suggestion may be exerted by a person. * * * If by a person, the
more prestige he enjoys in the estimation of the subject, the greater his
power of suggestion. A prestige person is one to whom you are
submissive."
,DR. H. SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 110; 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed.
1923) 465, 466
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CONCLUSION.

Various reasons have been advanced for the abolition of
the reasonable doubt doctrine. Some individuals would abolish it entirely without substituting anything in its place.
This group seems to feel that the reason for the existence of
the doctrine no longer exists. 50 Another group would make
the doctrine more effective by placing at the disposal of
defendants the same facilities and processes of the state that
are available to the prosecutor. Among those who favor the
latter step are those who advocate the public defender idea.5 '
However, as long as persons are in danger of being convicted
on perjured testimony or because of the "mob spirit" or
because of hysteria, so long does the necessity for the doctrine exist. In this so-called civilized age it is still better to
permit an infinite number of offenders to escape punishment
52
than to punish one innocent person.
Various recommendations for the abolition of "Specialization Courts" have been made, but these have gone and still
go unheeded. 53 Changes in legal routine and procedure take
place very slowly, and when they finally are made, they are
looked upon as revolutionary.
In conclusion, it should be remembered that 54
"What the people want in our criminal courts is, of
course, a 'fair trial,' but they want a 'fair trial' that
results in the acquittal of the innocent and the conviction of the guilty-so long as he is convicted by what
they deem fair means."
The deplorable abuses to which the non-observance of this
fundamental doctrine of our law have led, make incumbent
upon lawyers an ever-zealous insistence upon its strict
5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 466.
5 R. H. SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 111; M.
DEFENDER 1-3, 36-40.
M. C. GOLDMAN, THE PUBLIC DEFENDER 5.

C.

GOLDMAN, THE PUBLIC

Recommendations made by Judge Seabury and others after the close of
the Magistrates' Courts' investigation in the First Judicial Department of the
State of New York. These recommendations sought to abolish such "Specialization Courts" as the "Women's Court."
"TiAIN, THE PRISONER AT THE BAR 232.
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observance. The convictions of defendants who are denied
the benefit of a reasonable doubt is not granting them the
"fair trial" that they want and have a right to expect. It is
to be hoped that the future will be more favorable for the
application of the doctrine of reasonable doubt.
MAX D. BLOSSNER.

New York Oity,
October 3, 1933.

